

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

MEMO FOR: Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [REDACTED]
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

25X1A

SUBJECT : Provision of Military Operational
Information for Production of
a National Intelligence
Situation Report

The attached discussion material is
submitted for consideration in connection
with your forthcoming meeting with
Secretary Brown.

[REDACTED]

Attachment:
Talking paper
w/atts.

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INFORMATION

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Approved For Release 2002/01/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200070002-6

IC 77-2467
13 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] USN
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community

FROM : [REDACTED]
Chief, Crisis Intelligence Branch/PAID/OPEI

SUBJECT : JCS-DCI Understanding on Support to
NISR Task Forces

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The DCI's forthcoming meeting with Secretary Brown may provide an opportunity to push for resolution of our negotiations with JCS on provision of military operational information to NISR task forces. The attached talking paper and tabbed documents are submitted for that purpose.

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Attachments:
As Stated

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Distribution:

- Orig. - Addressee w/atts.
1 - D/DCI/IC w/atts.
1 - D/OPEI w/atts.
1 - IC Registry w/atts.
1 - PAID Subject w/atts.
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OPEI/PAID/CIB [REDACTED]

(13 April 1977)

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TALKING PAPER FOR DCI-SECDEF MEETING

SUBJECT: Provision of Military Operational Information to
Production of a National Intelligence Situation
Report (NISR)

Background

--NISR procedures (Tab A) resulted from NSC complaint (Gen. Scowcroft) that White House is inundated by largely redundant intelligence reporting during crisis periods. Objective is to produce a single, comprehensive Community sitrep for National authorities.

--NISRs will be produced by an interagency task force activated by the DCI at crisis outset. A Community agency will be appointed executive agent for support of the task force. NISR procedures not yet formally approved by NFIB, but utilized during period following Korean Tree chopping incident.

Current Developments

--Since NISR is intended to include both foreign intelligence and crisis-related U.S. operational data, negotiation of an agreement with JCS for provision of latter to the task force was undertaken.

--Negotiations have proceeded for six months without resolution. Remaining apparent sticking point is JCS unwillingness, on security grounds, to provide data on operations being considered, but not yet approved or implemented. JCS would provide this to the DCI, but not to the NISR task force.

--In latest redraft of the proposed agreement (Tab B) forwarded to Mr. Latimer on 28 March, the JCS proviso is accepted.

Recommended Action Objectives

--Status of the agreement should be resolved soonest, so that procedures for effective task force operations can be completed and disseminated.

--In general, closer and more structured interaction between JCS and the Community during warning and crisis situations is required, particularly since intelligence observations frequently reflect reaction to or anticipation of U.S. military operations.

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Memorandum for Holders-1
NFIB-D-28.7/1.
13 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF NFIB-D-28.7/1

SUBJECT : Procedures for the Production
of a National Intelligence
Situation Report

REFERENCE: NFIB-D-28.7/1, 30 June 1976

1. All NFIB agency members have concurred in the "Procedures for the Production of a National Intelligence Situation Report". The DIA member concurred subject to the following proposed change:

Substitute language for page 6, I. Military Situation, to read:

"(Major actions, movements and operations involving US, friendly and hostile forces, as well as strategic considerations of hostile forces, as appropriate.)"

The Treasury member concurred subject to the addition of the following sentence to the end of paragraph 3, page 1:

"Other NFIB members will be asked to participate in the task force when the crisis involves matters within their areas of responsibility or competence."


2. While the Intelligence Community Staff element which prepared the subject document reports that there are no known problems with these changes, they appear to be substantive enough to warrant review and concurrence by the Board members.

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Memorandum for Holders-1
NFIB-D-28.7/1
13 August 1976

NFIB ACTION REQUESTED

3. Board members are requested to advise the Secretariat of their concurrence or comments on the above changes by close of business 24 August 1976.



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Executive Secretary

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

NFIB-D-28.7/1
30 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Procedures for the Production of a
National Intelligence Situation
Report

1. The attached procedures on this subject are circulated for NFIB consideration. They were prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff in coordination with principal production elements in CIA, DIA, INR and NSA.

NFIB ACTION REQUESTED

2. Board members are requested to advise the Secretariat by close of business 12 July 1976 of their concurrence in or other views on the attached procedures.



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Executive Secretary

Attachment

Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 58(1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

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NFIB-D- 28.7/1
30 June 1976

PROCEDURES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF A NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

PURPOSE

1. These procedures are designed to ensure that the need of high-level national consumers for frequent and timely intelligence during crises will be met by a National Intelligence Situation Report (Sitrep).

SITREP ACTIVATION

2. When international events, crises, or the needs of the NSC or its staff so demand, the DCI will direct that an interagency Task Force be formed for the purpose of producing an all-source Community-coordinated National Sitrep.

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION & STAFFING

3. CIA, DIA, State/INR, and NSA will form a Task Force to provide the 24-hour substantive support required to produce the National Sitrep. The DCI will designate one of these agencies to serve as his executive agent and to assume primary responsibility for producing the National Sitrep. The CIA will usually serve as executive agent but other agencies may be assigned this responsibility depending on the nature of the crisis. The executive agent will provide the facilities and other administrative support necessary for the publication and dissemination of the National Sitrep.

4. The executive agent will ask the participating agencies in the task force to assign analysts (when it is feasible for them to do so) to each of three daily task force shifts

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(scheduling on a nine-hour basis will allow one-hour overlaps between shifts). These analysts will be invited to contribute to the drafting of the Sitrep and will serve as intermediaries between the task force and their parent agencies. In this latter capacity, they should:

- Facilitate the flow of information from the field.
- Clear documents for use in the National Sitrep.
- Obtain clarification of information and answers to questions of a departmental nature.
- Relay information requirements to their parent agencies; and
- Assist in coordinating substantive judgments.

5. The Chief of the Task Force will be appointed by the executive agent. Unless other arrangements are specified by the DCI, the appropriate National Intelligence Officer will serve as the main link between the DCI, the Task Force, and the NSC Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) and NSC Staff.

CONTENT

6. The National Sitrep will seek to provide its readership with all intelligence and operational information bearing on the problem at hand, including sensitive intelligence information and information concerning US diplomatic initiatives and military activities.*

*Inclusion of certain categories of especially sensitive information might at times severely limit distribution of the Sitrep; in those instances, the Task Force should consider the issuance of more than one edition, i.e., one given normal dissemination, the other given only to a few named principals.

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7. In addition to reporting and explaining the latest developments, the National Sitrep will, as appropriate:

- Analyze the significance and implications of developments for the immediate future.
- Provide in special annexes analyses and estimates of greater scope or depth.
- Summarize pertinent intelligence management actions, such as collection initiatives, undertaken as a result of the crisis.

8. The Sitrep will be coordinated among producing agencies to the extent permitted by time. Publication will not be delayed in order to secure extensive coordination. Items which have not been coordinated will bear a notification to that effect.

9. Coordination will be accomplished via CONTEXT (when all terminals become operational), LDX, secure phone, or any other available means. Producing agencies will ensure that all Sitrep information distributed by LDX receives the highest possible handling and forwarding precedence.

10. Important substantive disagreement will be clearly expressed in the National Sitrep and the dissenting organizations identified.

FREQUENCY

11. The Sitrep will be published as often as the particular circumstances of the crisis and the needs of the consumer require.

FORMAT

12. The National Sitrep will be prepared in a standard format--standard cover and editorial approach (see attachment)--but the precise organization of each issue will be determined by the Task Force.

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DISTRIBUTION

13. The National Sitrep will be designed for and sent to the President. It will also be disseminated to members of the National Security Council, other senior officials of the Government designated by the DCI, NSC Staff members, and senior members of the Intelligence Community. Situation reports prepared by individual organizations within the Community for their own purposes will not be disseminated to the White House except on specific request from those consumers. (This does not, of course, preclude dissemination to the White House Situation Room.)

TERMINATION AND CRITIQUE

14. The DCI will determine when production of the Sitrep should cease. Following the crisis, the Intelligence Community Staff will, when so requested by the DCI, conduct a review of Task Force activities, solicit the views of consumers concerning the adequacy of intelligence support provided, and recommend improvements in procedures.

ATTACHMENT:

Sample Format

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(CLASSIFICATION)

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S A M P L E

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

Prepared by (e.g., CIA) as Executive Agent for
the Director of Central Intelligence with the
participation of DIA, NSA and State/INR.

AREA Middle East:

NUMBER 6-76

PERIOD 0600-1800 hours

DATE 9 October 1976

Copy ____ of ____

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Note: As a general rule, and as time permits, the presentation of information should be organized along the lines suggested below. But the Task Force will determine the sequence of these sections and whether or not events warrant such discrete coverage.

SUMMARY & PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Reports, synthesizes, and explains the major late-breaking developments in the crisis (from Sections I, II, III, below) and highlights material from Section IV and the Annexes.

I. MILITARY SITUATION

(Major actions, movements, operations, and strategic considerations involving US and other forces.)

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

(Major political and foreign policy considerations involving US and other governments.)

III. ECONOMIC SITUATION

(Major economics, trade, and energy considerations involving US and other governments, or international groups.)

IV. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

(Major activities by the United Nations, or other international organizations, and Third World countries, likely to affect the course of the crisis in particular or US strategic and foreign policy interests in general.

Annexes (illustrative)

1. Special Topical Report
2. In-depth Analysis, Estimate

Distribution (illustrative)

(Authentication)

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. White House (1-30) | Director, Sitrep Task Force |
| 2. State Dept (31-60) | |
| 3. Defense (DIA and NSA) (61-90) | |
| 4. CIA (91-120) | |
| 5. IC Staff (121-130) | |
| 6. USIB (NFIB) (131-140) | |
| 7. DCI Designees (141-?) | |

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Approved For Release 2002/01/04 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200070002-6

: 23 March 1977

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

SUBJECT: Provision of Military Operational Information for
the Production of a National Intelligence Situation
Report

Background

The National Security Council's Contingency Planning Group has requested the Director of Central Intelligence to take measures to produce a single National Intelligence Situation Report for the President and other senior consumers during crises, or when international events or the needs of the NSC so demand. The National Intelligence Situation Report is intended to be an all-source product, coordinated within the Intelligence Community, which summarizes all relevant military and political information bearing on the situation. The Report will be produced by an interagency task force drawn from among the principal producing agencies of the Intelligence Community, i.e., CIA, DIA, State/INR, and NSA. The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for determining when a National Intelligence Situation Report is to be produced and for appointing one of the producing agencies to serve as his executive agent for the production effort.

Purpose

The purpose of this memorandum is to ensure (1) that the facts and analytical judgments presented in the National Intelligence Situation Report take into account all relevant operational information pertaining to the disposition and employment of U.S. military forces and (2) that the provision of military operational information to the National Intelligence Situation Report Task Force does not in any way conflict with the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisors to the President or with the responsibilities and authority of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide direct advice to the President on all military matters.

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Agreement

In consideration of these requirements and conditions, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence agree as follows:

1. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide to the National Intelligence Situation Report Task Force all relevant information related to ongoing movements and operations of U.S. military forces and approved plans for future movements and operations. This information is to be provided with the understanding that, unless specifically precluded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it may be included in the National Intelligence Situation Report for the President and other senior Government officials and that it may also be disseminated as necessary within the Intelligence Community.

2. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff will inform the Director of Central Intelligence of all relevant information concerning U.S. military plans, movements, and operations which are under consideration, but which have not been approved. Such information will not be disseminated to National Intelligence Situation Report Task Forces.

HAROLD BROWN
Secretary of Defense

GEORGE BROWN
General, U.S. Air Force
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director of Central Intelligence